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Dippel: Medical Decision-Making

SOMEONE TO WATCH OVER ME':
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR HOPELESSLY ILL
INCOMPETENT ADULT PATIENTS

INTRODUCTION:

SILENT CONVERSATIONS IN THE DARK

Every day, as I have for several years now, I talk to a man who does not
respond to me. He is oblivious to my presence as I enter his world of unknowns.
He appears equally oblivious to his own presence: I don't know if he knows
where he is, or even who he is.
On tip-toe, I peer curiously into the window of his mind. I don't know if he
feels the touch of my hand as I stroke his face, or if he hears the sound of my
voice as I speak to him. I don't know if he comprehends the music and meaning
in my words when I tell him that I love him. I doubt that he understands what
has become of him: his beautiful, well-educated brain and once-athletic body have
been severely damaged by his nearly twenty-year battle with multiple sclerosis.
Squinting my eyes and hoping to see what I suspect is not there, I wonder if he
even remembers that I am his daughter.
His face is expressionless; his body motionless, except for an occasional
reflexive cough or yawn. As I look at him, I am reminded momentarily of the
time in my life when he was strong and I was dependent upon him. Now, I find
a strange irony in his helplessness. He is wholly dependent upon the continuous
loving care of my mother, and the proper functioning of a myriad of tubes and
machines.
As I prepare to leave his bedside, a host of gnawing unknowns remain. Were
those tears I saw, or were his eyes simply watering? Did his eyes move to follow
my voice, or was that just a twitch? Does he feel pain, or are his occasional
grimaces merely the product of uncontrollable reflexes? And then, the most
burning, awesome question: would he want to live like this, or would he rather
be allowed to die?
My father is among the hopelessly ill: those who are precariously poised on
the line that separates life from death. Some, like my father, are in what has been

NOTE: This comment is dedicated in loving memory to my father, who passed away after this comment
was written, and as this issue of the AKRON LAW REVIEW was being prepared for publication.
' Someone To Watch Over Me (song written by George Gershwin and Ira Gershwin, sung by Willie
Nelson on Stardust Album. Columbia Records).
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termed a "persistent vegetative state".2 Others are comatose.3 By virtue of their
brain-damaged condition, all are incompetent. 4 Although patients who are
terminally ill5 are often incompetent, hopelessly ill patients are distinguished
from terminally ill patients in that hopelessly ill patients do not face imminent
death. Quite often, the contrary is true; hopelessly ill patients may "exist" on the
brink of death for years.
This comment focuses on the predicament of the hopelessly ill incompetent
adult patient. The comment first discusses the legal framework for medical
decision-making in general. Next, it examines the legal and medical distinctions
between competent and incompetent patients, and the implications of those
distinctions. The comment then explores the options in caring for hopelessly ill
incompetent adult patients, and the persons who may or should be responsible for
exercising those options. The comment also considers the bases upon which the
options may be exercised. Finally, the comment contains an examination of the
current state of opinion and the law on medical decision-making for hopelessly
ill incompetent adult patients, and a proposal for change.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING

In general, medical decision-making is governed by a well-established legal
framework, the paramount principle of which is informed consent to treatment.
Within that principle are implicated several other fundamental concepts, including
informed refusal of treatment, and the rights of self-detcrmination and privacy.
A discussion of this framework is an essential preface to an exploration and
nalysis of the narrower subject of this comment.

2

Generally, "[t]he persistent vegetative state is a form of eyes-open unconsciousness in which the patient

has periods of wakefulness and physiological sleep/wake cycles, but at no time is the patient aware of
him- or herself or the environment. [This condition] is the result of a functioning brain stem and the total
loss of cerebral cortical functioning." Am. Acad. of Neurology, Position of the American Academy of
Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient,
39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125 (1989) [hereinafter Position].
3 The comatose patient is defined as one who is in "[an abnormal deep stupor (which occurs] in illness,
as a result of it, or due to an injury. The patient cannot be aroused by external stimuli." TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 390 (16th ed. 1989).
4 Incompetent patients have been variously defined as those who are "legally unable to execute a contract,
such as a brain-damaged individual," Id. at 901; those "[lacking the] ability, legal qualification, or fitness
to discharge [a] required duty," BLACK's LAW DICnONARY 390 (abr. 5th ed. 1983); and those who are
"[i]ncapable". TABER's CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 901 (16th ed. 1989).
5

Terminally ill patients are those with "[illnesses] that because of [their] nature can be expected to cause
2
[death]." Id. at 1836.
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Informed Consent
Every patient6 upon whom a medical or surgical procedure is to be
performed must first consent to that procedure." "Consent is an authorization, by
8
the patient.. ., that changes a touching from nonconsensual to consensual."
Unauthorized touching of another, as occurs where a procedure is performed upon
9
a patient without his consent, constitutes the tort of battery. Once a battery has
been committed upon a patient, neither absence of negligence, nor strict
compliance with the standards of medical practice in the performance of the
procedure is a valid defense.10 The nonconsensual touching, in and of itself,
constitutes the tort.
Because the patient is viewed at law as the master of his own person, he must
give informed consent to medical treatment." A patient must fully understand2
consent.'
the treatment to which he is consenting in order to give informed
Accordingly, a physician may not treat a patient without first explaining to the
patient "the risks and material facts" of the proposed treatment, as well as
alternatives which may include non-treatment. 13 Physicians must provide their
patients with adequate information to permit them to choose intelligently from
among the available options. 4
Two legal standards have been developed to determine the adequacy of
information that physicians disclose to their patients.15 The first of these, the
objective test, measures the adequacy of a physician's disclosure to his patient
against the level of information that other physicians in the community usually
disclose. 6 Unfortunately, this test fails to account for the human element
present in the patient. More flexible is the second standard: the subjective test.
This test defines the adequacy of disclosure based upon several factors: the
proposed treatment and its probable consequences, the patient's mental and
physical condition, and the patient's understanding of the physician's explanation

6 For purposes of this prefatory discussion, the patient will be presumed to be competent and capable of
making his own medical decisions.
7 G. POZGAR, LEGAL AsPECrs OF HEALTH CARE ADMINSTRATION 99

(1987).

aId.
91d.
10 Id.

" A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HosPrrAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 216 (1978).
12 G. POZGAR, supra note 7, at 100.
13 G. ANNAS,

THE RIGHTS OF HosPrrAL PATIENTS 57 (1975).
14G. POZGAR, supra note 7, at 100.
15 Id.

Published
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of the risks posed by the treatment.'7 Regardless of which test is applied, the
physician should chiefly be guided by the welfare and needs of the patient.s
There are modifications and exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent

which fit well within the parameters of the law. For example, courts recognize
the privilege of a physician to selectively disclose or withhold information for
"sound therapeutic reasons".' 9 Courts have further recognized the need to imply
consent where it is impossible to obtain informed consent and an emergency
situation requires immediate action to save a patient's life or to prevent permanent
20
injury.
Informed Refusal

A logical extension of the doctrine of informed consent is that a conscious,
mentally competent adult patient has the legal right to refuse any medical or
surgical procedure. 2' This right exists even when such a refusal is counter to the
best medical opinion about the necessity of the23 treatment 22 and despite the
treatment's life-saving or life-sustaining potential.
When a patient refuses treatment, the treating facility is obligated to ensure
that no member of its staff performs the treatment.u However, the treating
facility is also obligated to ensure that the physician and other members25of the
medical staff continue to treat the patient within the limits of his refusal.
Courts usually will not intervene to order treatment which has been refused
by a conscious, legally competent adult patient.26 To do so would be to violate
the patient's common law right of self-determination.27

I Id. at 101.
'a A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 11, at 228.
19A. SotrHWIcK, supra note 11, at 226. "Sound therapeutic reasons" include complication or hindrance
of treatment of the patient if his emotional state or personality is such that he could not deal properly with
full disclosure. Id.
20G. POZAR, supra note 7, at 107; A. SOUTlWICK, supra note 11, at 228.
21G. POZAR, supra note 7, at 108; G. ANNAS, supra note 13, at 79.
22 G.

POZAR, supra note 7, at 108; G. ANNAS, supra note 13, at 81.

23 G. POZGAR, supra note 7, at 108.
24 G. ANNAS, supra note 13, at 81.
25 id.
26

A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 11 at 229. Exceptions to this rule include cases in which the patient's right

to refuse treatment is outweighed by one of the state's compelling interests. Id. at 231.

27
Id. at 229.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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The Right of Self-Determination
One century ago, the United States Supreme Court enunciated what has today
become an oft-quoted legal principle. 2 "No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."29 The Court
continued, "[tihe right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
30
immunity: to be let alone.
The right of self-determination has been elaborated upon over the years, but
the key concept has remained unchanged. That is, in the words of Justice
Cardozo, that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body * * **,,31
This concern for an
individual's dignity is the cornerstone of court decisions that recognize patients'
constitutional right to control fundamental medical decisions that affect them.32
Thus, "[tihe right to be free of unwanted physical invasions has been
recognized as an integral part of the individual's constitutional freedoms, whether
termed a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, or an aspect of the
right to privacy contained in the notions of personal freedom which underwrote
the Bill of Rights. 3' 3 The common law right of self-determination is grounded
in the concept of individual dignity and bodily integrity, and is closely tied to the
constitutionally-based right of privacy.'
The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy, although not expressly set forth in the law of this
country, has been recognized to exist by virtue of the "penumbra" of the specific

Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). See also Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
9Jd. at 251.
30 Id. (quoting COOLEY ON TORTS 29).
3'Schloendorff v. Soc'y. of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (Ct App. 1914).
32 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988).
See also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (CL App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); McConnell v. Beverly
Enters.-Conn., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989).
33 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 (4th Cir. 1987). See also Bradley, Does Autonomy
7

Require Informed and Specific Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment?, 5 ISSUES IN L. & MED.

301 (1989); Rouse, Does Autonomy Require Informed and Specific Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment?, 5 IssuES INL & MED. 321 (1989).

Published
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3' Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585.

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 6
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3 & 4

guarantees of the Bill of Rights.3 5 Specifically, the United States Supreme Court
has grounded a constitutional right of privacy in the protections of the first, third,

fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments, 36 recognizing "that a right of
of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
personal privacy, or a guarantee
37
Constitution.
the
under
One such zone of privacy has been found to encompass the making of
medical decisions. 3' Because decisions to consent to or refuse medical treatment
are so fundamentally important and utterly personal, "it is virtually inconceivable
that the right of privacy would not apply to [them]. 3 9 This is consistent with
the Supreme Court's holdings that personal rights that are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"' or "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" are
encompassed by the constitutional right of privacy."
The right of privacy, however broadly construed, is not absolute. 42 Rather,
it must be balanced against certain state interests.43 In the context of medical
decision-making, the state's interests include the preservation of life, the
protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance
of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."

35 Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

But see separate concurring opinions of Justices
Goldberg and Harlan at 486-501. Justice Goldberg wrote that the ninth amendment established the
existence of a number of rights despite the fact that they are not enumerated in the Constitution. One of
these rights, according to Justice Goldberg, is the right of privacy. Id. at 486-99. Justice Harlan wrote
that the right of privacy is grounded not in the ninth amendment, but rather in the concept of liberty
promoted in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 499-501. See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851, 2851 n.7 (1990). discussed, infra note 250.
36

id.

37 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), reh'g. denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).

" See e.g., McConnell, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596; Sevems v. Wilmington Med. Center, 425 A.2d 156
(Del. Ch. 1980); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; Leach v.
Akron Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1. 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); Gray, 697 F. Supp. 580.
39 In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983).
40 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325-326

(1937)).
4I Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
42 Gray, 697 F. Supp at 588.
4

id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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Of the four interests which may be asserted to override the right of privacy,
the state's interest in the preservation of life is the most significant. 45 This
interest is strongest when the state seeks to protect an individual who is incapable
of protecting himself and may thus be abused.' However, in the case of a
patient refusing treatment, the interest weakens greatly as the degree of bodily
invasion inherent in the proposed treatment increases, and the benefit to be
derived from that invasion diminishes. 47 The state's interest in preserving a
patient's life is greatest where the patient's affliction is curable, and weakest
where the patient is hopelessly or terminally ill.4
Courts are in agreement that, in the case of a hopelessly or terminally ill
patient, a point is reached at which the state's interest is no longer significant
enough to override the patient's right of privacy. 49 In the words of the Saikewicz Court:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of
the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not
by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent
human being the right of choice.5"
Accordingly, the state's interest in preserving life must encompass the recognition
of an individual's right to avoid degrading and futile life-sustaining efforts.5'
Because deference to the state's interest in the preservation of life has yielded
to the concept of respect for the patient as a person, the state's interest in
preserving life has only rarely been cited as an explicit rationale for overriding
52
a patient's right of privacy.

45

kl One commentator points out that despite its significance, "both the basis for and meaning of this
state interest are elusive." Oberman, Withdrawal of Life Support: Individual Autonomy Against Alleged
State Interests in PreservingLife, 20 LoY. U. CH. L. . 797, 806-07 (1989).
46

Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589.

47 Severns, 425 A.2d at 159.

" Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
49 Severns, 425 A.2d at 159.
'o

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.

"Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 588.
32 Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservationof Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L J. 891,
891 (1989). In this excellent in-depth examination of the state's interest in preserving life, the author
discusses four possible bases for the interest: "(1) protecting patient wishes; (2) protecting patient welfare;
(3) enforcing community beliefs about the inherent value or "sanctity" of life; and (4) fashioning a legal
doctrine that is not susceptible to undesirable erosion (the 'slippery slope' danger)." Id. at 893. The
author determines that the state's interest in the preservation of life as presently constituted is unworkable
and suggests several ways to resolve conflicts between the many hidden meanings of the state's interest

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991 Id. at 893-977.
and the interests
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Closely tied to the state's interest in the preservation of life is its interest in
preventing suicide. Theoretically, the latter interest becomes relevant whenever
53 However,
a patient's refusal of medical treatment would cause his death.
courts wisely distinguish between purposefully causing one's own death, and
resigning oneself to the hastened arrival of a death which is inevitable due to a
hopeless underlying condition. Hence, the act of a competent adult in refusing
medical treatment does not necessarily constitute suicide. 5
Only slightly more successful in overriding patients' right of privacy has been
the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties. 6 This interest is usually
asserted by the state as parens patriae to protect the dependents of a patient
refusing treatment.5 7 Clearly, by its very nature, this interest fails to focus upon
the interests of the patient in questioni s For that and other reasons, the
9
assertion of this interest as a basis for state intervention is not easily justified.
The fourth state interest, maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession, was traditionally a decisive factor in judicial decisions to override a
patient's right of privacy. 60 However, the power of this interest has been tempered by changes in the law and in the attitudes of medical professionals.6 '
"Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that
all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances." 62 To the
contrary, the prevalent medical ethical practice now recognizes that the dying,
especially those for whom death drags its feet, are frequently less in need of
medical treatment than they are of understanding and comfort 63 The Massachu-

53Oberman, supra note 45, at 804.
'4 Id. at

804-05.

55Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.l1,

370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 1.

56Id. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
37 Oberman, supra note 45, at 803. The interest is commonly asserted where the patient who refuses
treatment is a pregnant woman or the mother of minor children. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75
N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804,
490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985).
58Oberman, supra note 45, at 803.
59Id. One of the other pitfalls of the state's interest in protecting third parties to which this commentator
points is the disparate application of the interest to men and women. Id. at 803-04. The commentator
suggests that all of the cases in which this interest overrides a patient's right of privacy so as to preclude
refusal of treatment involve female patients. I&aat 804. She further notes that the autonomy of male
patients is not similarly trampled by this particular state interest Id.
60 Id. at 801-02.

6' Id. at 802.
62

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
63 id.
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setts Supreme Court thoughtfully commented on this issue in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz":

Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate
circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores; such a doctrine
does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession, the proper

role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in protecting the same. It is not necessary to deny a right of self-determination
to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors, hospitals, and
medical personnel in attendance on the patient. Also, if the doctrines of
informed consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the right
to bodily integrity, [cites omitted] and control of one's own fate, then
those rights are superior to the [interests of the medical profession].65
Competence: The Ability to be Autonomous
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that a competent adult patient has
the right, in most cases, to be the master of his own destiny insofar as medical
decision-making is concerned. This concept is underscored by several recent
cases.
In Bouvia v. Superior Court,66 California's Second District Court of Appeal
cited a plethora of legal authority in support of its order which allowed a
competent quadriplegic woman to remove the nasogastric feeding tube that had
been inserted and maintained in her against her will. 67 The Court reasoned that
if "a person of adult years and in sound mind" has a legal right to determine the
course of his medical treatment, that right must certainly encompass a right to

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728.

Id. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27. Although courts have begun to recognize the liberalized view
theoretically espoused by the medical profession, physicians appear, in reality, to be reluctant to vest full
control over medical decision-making in their patients. Oberman, supra note 45, at 802, 802 n.40. This
is evidenced by the fact that right-to-die cases normally arise where a physician determines the course of
a patient's treatment over the objections of the patient or his family. Id. at 802 n.40; Rhoden, Litigating
Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 429 (1988). Rhoden suggests that the reality of such situations
is that the physician and hospital are in complete control and the patient or his family can prevail only
by challenging that control. Id
"179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
67 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, (citing, inter alia, Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972)); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486
A.2d 1209 (1988); AM. Hosp. ASS'N., POLICY AND STATEMENT OF PATIENTS' CHOICES OF TREATMENT

OrIoNs (1985); COUNCIL ON ETHIcAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASSN., wrrHOLDING OR
wrIHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (1986); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N. FOR THE STuDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991(1983).
FOREGO LFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT
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refuse even medical treatment that may prolong or sustain his life.6 "The right
to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental.... Its exercise requires no
one's approval. It is not merely one vote subject to being overridden by medical
opinion."'
The Court analogized Elizabeth Bouvia's situation to that of William Bartling
in the earlier case of Bartling v. Superior Court.70 Bartling was a competent
adult who suffered from an array of incurable, but not terminal health problems.7 ' During a physical examination, a tumor was discovered in his lung and
was subsequently biopsied by inserting a needle into the lung.72 The lung
deflated, and efforts to reinflate it were unsuccessful.73 Consequently, Bartling
underwent an emergency tracheostomy,' 4 and was placed on a ventilator.7 ' His
hands were restrained to prevent him from removing the ventilator tube.76
Bartling and his family repeatedly asked the treating physicians to discontinue
the ventilation and to remove the restraints. 77 When the physicians did not
honor their requests, Bartling executed documents which stated that he found
"intolerable the living conditions forced upon him . . . and . . . [his] being
continuously connected to [a] ventilator."08 Bartling wrote that his wish was to
have the ventilator removed; that he was aware that doing so would ultimately
cause his death; and that he was "willing to accept that risk rather than continue
the burden of [an] artificial existence which [he found] unbearable, degrading and
79
dehumanizing."
The California Court of Appeal held that the right to have life-support
systems removed is not limited to comatose or terminally ill patients80 The
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (quoting Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9,
104 Cal. Rptr. at 516, and citing Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484; Bartling, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220.
69
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1131, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
70

Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220.

"' Id. at 187, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
72

id.

7

3 d.

74 A tracheostomy is a surgical incision of the skin on the neck over the trachea which creates an airway
into which a tracheostomy tube may be inserted and attached to a mechanical ventilator. TABER's
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY 1887-88 (16th ed. 1989).
7' Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 187, 209 Cal. Rpt. at 221.
76

id.

"

id.

7

Id. at 188, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.

79id.

'0 Id. at 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Unfortunately, Batding died the day before the Court heard his case.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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Court stated that the "right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical
treatment has its origins in the constitutional right of privacy . . . [which]
guarantees to the individual the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent
to, intrusions of his bodily integrity.'"" Moreover, judicial approval is not a
prerequisite to a patient's ability to exercise his right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment.' In fact, prior judicial approval of such decisions may not
only be "unnecessary", but "unwise". 3
Subsequent decisions have proven that the right of a competent adult patient
to refuse medical treatment - even that which sustains life - is far from illusory.
In 1989, Larry McAfee, a young civil engineer" who was rendered
quadriplegic in a 1985 motorcycle accident, received permission from the
Supreme Court of Georgia to disconnect the ventilator that sustains him. 5 The
Court held that a competent adult patient has the right to refuse medical
treatment, provided the right is not outweighed by conflicting state interests.8
McAfee was unquestionably competent, having gone so far as to design the
87
device that he hoped would enable him to disconnect the ventilator himself.
The Court found, and the state conceded, that no state interests outweighed
McAfee's right to disconnect his life-support equipment.8 "
Another recent decision 9 eloquently summarized the relationship between
a competent adult patient's right to refuse treatment and the state interests against
which it is balanced. The Nevada Supreme Court stated:
The state's interest in the preservation of life relates to meaningful
life.... [The state has no ... interest in interfering with the natural

l Id. at 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.

32 Id.

83 id.

" Anderson, The Right to Choose Death: Atlanta Judge Allows Quadriplegicto Turn off His Ventilator,
A.B.A. J., Dec., 1989, at 18.
" State v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579, 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989). McAfee had earlier won the right in a lower
court ruling following a 45-minute hearing at his bedside. In re McAfee, No. D-70960 slip op. (Super.
Ct. Fulton Cty., Ga. Sept. 6, 1989). On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
lower court's holding. State v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579, 385 S.E.2d 651. McAfee has since changed his
mind, despite the fact that the quality of his life is poor. Ross, Quadriplegic Pleadsfor Change in
Georgia's Laws on Carefor Disabled,Akron Beacon J., Feb. 22, 1990, at A-2. col. 1.
"McAfee,
87 Id.

259 Ga. 579, 385 S.E.2d at 651.

"Id.
9McKay v. Bergstedt, 106 Nev. 808, 801 P.2d 617 (1990). The 31-year-old patient-plaintiff in this case

had been a quadriplegic since a swimming accident at age ten. He had been cared for by his parents, but
father was near death at the time the action was filed. He feared for 11
had passed away and his1991
his mother
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
his well-being in their absence and he preferred death.
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processes of dying among citizens whose lives are irreparablydevastated
by injury or illness to the point where life may be sustained only by contrivance or radical intervention. In such situations as [here], only the
competent adult patient can determine the extent to which his or her
artificially extended life has meaning and value in excess of the death
value.9"
Emerging from all of these decisions is the key concept that the right to
determine one's own course of medical treatment is firmly vested in competent
adult patients. Accordingly, for a court considering such a case, the threshold
issue is whether the patient is competent9' to make his own medical decisions.
However, a finding of incompetence does not mean that the patient's right is
lost, for equally clear is the pronouncement of the courts that a patient's right of
privacy "should not be discarded solely on the basis that [his] condition prevents
[his] conscious exercise of [it]." 2 Courts have consistently permitted the right
9
of privacy of incompetent patients to be asserted on their behalf by a surrogate.
"An incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment, should be equal to a
competent patient's right to do so." 94 "The recognition of [a right to refuse
medical treatment in certain circumstances] must extend to... an incompetent,
as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to
95

both."

I DON'T THINK, THEREFORE I AM NOT?:
THE PARADOXICAL INCOMPETENT PATIENT

One's right to determine his own course of treatment does not divest with the
onset of incompetence. It is this concept which preserves the rights of self-

90 Id. at 817, 801 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
91 A discussion of the procedure through which competency is determined is beyond the scope of this
comment For an exhaustive discussion of the issue as it pertains to medical decision-making, see Note,
Determining Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases, 24 GA. L REV. 733 (1990) (proposing that
the best test for assessing the level of competence of a "conscious non-terminal patient" is to "measure
the patient's capacity to understand the risks, benefits and alternatives to his decision as well as his ability
to give rational reasons for his decision." Id. at 751.) See also COMM'N. ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE
ELDERLY, AM. B. ASS'N. & YOUNG LAWYERS Div.. COMMIlTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES
TO THE ELDERLY, AM. B. ASS'N., GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY: A PRIMER FOR ATTORNEYS 20-24,
36 (1990); COMM'N. ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, AM. B. ASS'N. & COMM'N. ON LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF THE ELDERLY, AM. B. Ass'N., GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 15-18 (1988).
92 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
9

id.

'4Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 124, 660 P.2d at 744.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
"Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
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determination and privacy in the hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients upon
whom this comment is focused. These people include those who are comatose,
those who are in a persistent vegetative state, those who are brain dead, and those
who suffer from terminal illnesses which have impaired their cognitive functioning. Each condition is slightly different from the others, and each thereby
presents slightly different legal nuances.
The Comatose Patient
Ronald E. Cranford, one of the nation's foremost authorities on neurology and
medical ethics, 96 has defined coma as a "state of sleeplike (eyes-closed)
unarousability."97 Coma results from extensive damage to that part of the brain
which is essential in initiating and maintaining wakefulness and in directing attention.98
Therefore, comatose patients are permanently unconscious. 99 They
have no cerebral cortical °° functions which would indicate consciousness or
behavioral interaction with their environments.' 0'
However permanent their condition, though, such patients cannot be said to
be chronically unconscious."' 2 Because of their impaired gag, cough and
swallowing reflexes and resultant inability to clear the throat and lungs of
secretions, comatose patients typically suffer frequent - and often fatal respiratory infections. 10 3 In that respect, they may be labeled terminally ill, as
death generally occurs within six to twelve months.1°4 The absence of chronicity of coma as opposed to the extreme chronicity of the persistent vegetative state
is but one important distinction between the two conditions. 0 5

96

Cranford, Going Out in Style, The American Way, 1987, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 208, 210

(1989).
Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting The Facts Straight), 18
HAsTrINGS CENITER REP. 27, 28 (1988).
97

"I d.; TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1591 (16th ed. 1989).
99TABER's CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 98.

'0 '"The cerebrum is concerned with sensations or the interpretation of sensory impulses; and all voluntary
muscular activities. It is the seat of consciousness and the center of the higher mental faculties such as
memory, learning, reasoning, judgment, intelligence, and the emotions." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 326 (16th ed. 1989). The cerebral cortex is the thin fibrous neuron layer that covers the
cerebrum. Id. at 420.
'0'Cranford, supra note 97, at 28.
102 id.

10 Id.

104Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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The Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) Patient

Cranford contrasts the persistent Vegetative state (PVS) with coma by defining
PVS as a form of "eyes-open" permanent unconsciousness."° In PVS patients,
the brain stem 7 remains largely intact; however, there is an absence of cerebral
cortical functioning. 08 PVS patients are amented; they have completely lost
their mental functions."
Awake, but unaware, PVS patients are not cognizant of themselves or their
surroundings, although their eyes may wander and appear to be "observing"
events about them." 0 Voluntary reactions are absent,' as is the capacity to
experience pain and suffering." 2 PVS patients do, however, experience sleepwake cycles, and also maintain primitive protective gag, cough, and respiratory
reflexes." 3 Their ability to rely upon these reflexes further distinguishes PVS

patients from comatose patients, in that they are not as susceptible to respiratory
infections and thus usually live longer." 4

PVS patients are not brain dead, 1 5 nor are they terminally il.116 Although the prospect of recovery from PVS is almost nonexistent, there have been
a few documented cases in which PVS patients have fully recovered cognitive

106id.
107

The brain stem maintains the body's "most primitive protective reflexes, such as the cough, gag,....

swallowing, and spontaneous respiration." Id. at 27.
'06 Id. at 28.
'09 Id.

PVS is usually precipitated by a cardiac or respiratory arrest and the resultant ischemia (lack of
blood flow) and/or hypoxia (lack of oxygen) to the brain. Id. Although the brain stem is fairly resistant
to ischenia and hypoxia and is generally resilient enough to continue functioning, the cerebral cortex is
less able to withstand such trauma and will be essentially destroyed after four to six minutes in either
condition. Id. The post-hypoxic or post-ischemic patient will frequently be in a transient coma for
several days or even several weeks. Id. During this period, mechanical ventilation is often required. Id.
Afterward, the patient will lapse from the eyes-closed unconscious state of coma into the eyes-open
unconscious PVS state. Id.
110Id.
t

Id.

112 Position,
"1

supra note 2.

Id.; Cranford, supra note 97, at 28.

114 Id.

Such patients may survive for "five, ten, and twenty years" provided that artificial nutrition and
hydration are continued. Cranford, supra note 97, at 31; Position, supra note 2. PVS patients cannot
chew or swallow and must be fed a liquid diet through either a nasogastric tube or an endogastric tube.
Id. Without nutrition and hydration, PVS patients will usually die in less than thirty days. Cranford,
supra note 97, at 31.
115 Cranford, supra note 97.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
116 Position,
supra note 2.
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functioning after prolonged periods in PVS." 7 Invariably, however, these
patients are left severely and permanently paralyzed."'
The Brain Dead Patient
The significant difference between PVS or comatose patients and brain dead
patients is that when brain death occurs, the entire brain, including the brain stem,
is destroyed." 9 These patients are in the "deepest possible coma", 2 ' and have
experienced total and irreversible brain damage.'
There are no voluntary or
involuntary movements, although spinal-based reflexes (those not dependent upon
the brain stem) may be present.1
Brain death occurs when a primary injury or trauma to the brain causes a
secondary injury in the form of brain swelling. 23 The pressure inside the skull,
caused by the swelling, quickly exceeds the systolic blood pressure and halts the
blood flow to the entire brain.
Brain dead patients require total respiratory
support; 25 however, vegetative homeostatic functions such as the circulatory
26
and digestive processes are able to continue.
An accurate determination of brain death may be made in a period of hours
to days. 127 As with coma, brain death is not
a chronic condition and usually
28
does not last more than six to eight weeks.
117Id. at 30;, Snyder, Cranford, Rubens, Bundlie & Rockswold, Delayed Recoveryfrom PostanoxicPersistent Vegetative State, 14 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 152 (1983).

"o Cranford, supra note 97, at 30. This condition is known as "locked-in syndrome". Id.
"9 Cranford, Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 63, 65 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982).
'2

Id. at 66.

121Cranford,

supra note 97, at 28.

"2 Cranford, supra note 119, at 66.
'2

id. at 65.

'2

Id. at 65-66.

'25 Id.

at 66.

'26Cranford, supra note 97, at 27.
127 Cranford, supra note 119 at 66.
la ld. Whole brain death has been an accepted criterion for human death since the Harvard criteria were

published in 1968. Id. at 69 (citing Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968)). Nonetheless,
there are some who would blur the distinction between PVS, comatose, and brain dead patients and
essentially pronounce them all dead. Youngner & Bartlett, Human Death and High Technology: The
Failure of the Whole-Brain Death Formulations, 99 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 252 (1983). See
also Wikler, Not Dead, Not Dying?: Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State, 18 HASINGS
CENTER REP. 41 (1988). They propose that loss of consciousness and cognition constitutes the death of
a human, and that persons who are sustained in such a condition are mere "mindless organisms". Id. at
256. Thus, when cerebral and brain stem functions are irreversibly lost, the proponents of this definition
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991As yet, this controversial definition of death remains unpopular
would pronounce
the patient dead. Id.
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The Terminally Ill Incompetent Patient
At this point, several distinctions can be drawn between terminally ill
incompetent patients and the three categories of incompetent patients previously
discussed. Of the three, the situation of the terminally ill patient most closely
parallels that of the comatose patient. The PVS patient may linger indefinitely,
and the brain dead patient is, for all intents and purposes, dead. But for the
comatose or terminally ill patient, death is an imminent, though not immediate,
reality.
Terminally ill patients are those with incurable or irreversible conditions that
29
have a high probability of causing death within one year despite treatment.
The term "terminally ill" is somewhat more restrictive than the term "incurably
ill". Therefore, the two should be distinguished. 30 Incurable illness will
ultimately cause death, but, in contrast to terminal illness, no maximum life
expectancy is set.' 3 ' A determination of terminal illness, once the decisive
factor in refusal of treatment cases, 3 2 is now viewed as a poor criterion for
deciding whether treatment may be foregone. 33 It has become clear that
"classification as terminally ill is not a sine qua non for application of the right
to [refuse treatment].' 34

TO TREAT OR NOT TO TREAT?:
TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

While decisions to treat or not to treat a medical condition arise in even the
most benign contexts, the import of such decisions is most substantial when made
at or near the end of a patient's life. The term "life", as used here, denotes
meaningful life, for, although certain permanently unconscious patients may "live"
in the sense that they may exist for years, their meaningful, productive, interactive
lives have ended.

and unaccepted. Id. at 252.
129 HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE

CARE OFTHE DYING 141 (1987). Not all terminally ill patients are incompetent. However, this comment

will focus upon only those who are incompetent.
'30

A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE § 4.9 (1989).

13 Id.
'32

Id. at§ 4.8.

id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
134 Id.
133
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When a hopelessly ill incompetent adult patient's life hangs in the medical
balance, whether by virtue of terminal illness, brain death, or permanent uncon-

sciousness, what are his options? Who exercises those options, and on what
bases?
Treatment Options

Essentially, three treatment options for patients at or near the end of life exist:
treatment may be withheld altogether, treatment may be initiated and either

continued or withdrawn; or, in the most controversial scenario, active euthanasia
may be pursued.
1. Withholding Treatment
In medical-ethical circles, withholding treatment is tacitly favored over
withdrawing treatment, because of an ethereal distinction between acts of
omission and acts of commission. 35 More specifically, in the context of endof-life medical decision-making, merely omitting or withholding life-sustaining
treatment is viewed as allowing the patient to die. 3 6 Conversely, 1committing
37
the act of withdrawing such treatment is viewed by some as killing.
However, court decisions have somewhat blurred the line on the basis of the
fiduciary doctor-patient relationship. 38 Thus, withholding and withdrawing
treatment have come to be judged equally against the singular standard of
"professional norms".
Cases such as Barber v. Superior Court,'4 In re
14
42 have borne out the theory
Conroy, ' and Satz v. Perlmutter,1
that, right or
wrong, failing to institute artificial nutrition, hydration or ventilation is equivalent
to withdrawing such measures once instituted. 43
13 See Brock, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: Is It Killing?, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY
MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 117, 118-19 (J. Lynn ed. 1986);
N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 32-35 (1987).
13 Brock, supra note 135, at 118. This author draws an analogy to illustrate the point: "Suppose you
consciously omit to send food to persons whom you know are starving in a famine in some distant land.
The famine victims die. No one would say that you killed them by not sending food, but rather that you
allowed them to die . " I.
Id. at 123.
137Id.

'33 N. CANTOR, supra note 135, at 32-33.
'39 Id. at 33.

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that "[w]hether
necessary treatment is withheld at the outset or withdrawn later on, the consequence - the patient's death is the same." Id. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1234.
,42
362 So. 2d 160 (1978), affid. 379 So. 2d 359 (1980).
'4

14,

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209; Satz, 362
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
So.
2d at 163.
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The issue of withholding life-sustaining treatment arises with respect to
primarily two types of treatment: artificial nutrition and hydration, and mechanical
ventilation. It is generally accepted that artificial nutrition and hydration may be
foregone in three situations.'" In the first, the provision of nutrition and
hydration is futile because of an innate problem which disallows either the
introduction or absorption of the food. 145 In the second situation, provision of
artificial nutrition and hydration does not benefit the patient because he is in a
permanent state of unconsciousness and is oblivious to even his own artificiallysustained existence.'4 Finally, artificial nutrition and hydration may appropriof such measures would be more
ately be withheld where the introduction
1 47

burdensome than beneficial to the patient.

The answers are not as clear-cut in cases that involve mechanical ventilation.
The dilemma is exacerbated by the immediacy of the situation. Obviously, the

question of whether to initiate mechanical ventilation demands a more instantaneous answer than does the question of whether to introduce artificial nutrition
and hydration. Moreover, in cases where the initiation of mechanical ventilation
implicates resuscitative rather than merely supportive efforts, the patient has
lapsed from the living to the dead, and may as easily be brought back to the
living. This raises numerous ethical and legal issues. One of the most troubling
issues pertaining to the withholding of mechanical ventilation from hopelessly ill
incompetent adult patients is the appropriateness of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
orders.148
Because resuscitative efforts must be initiated immediately, the consequences
of a DNR order that has been issued to prevent resuscitation and initiation of
mechanical ventilation are dramatic and irreversible. 49

144 Lynn

& Childress, Must Patients Always be Given Food and Water?, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY

MEANS, THE CHOICE To FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 47, 51-53 (J. Lynn ed. 1986). For
further insight into this issue, see Grisez, Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Provided to Permanently
Unconscious and OtherMentally Disabled Persons?, 5 IssuEs IN L & MED. 181 (1989).
'
'46
'4

Id. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52-53.

148 See Youngner, Do Not Resuscitate Orders: No Longer Secret, But Still a Problem, 17 HASTINGS

CENTER REP. 24, 24 (1987). Essentially, a DNR order is a written order made with the consent of a
competent patient or an incompetent patient's surrogate, by the patient's attending physician, prohibiting
resuscitative efforts if cardiac or respiratory arrest occur. See Greenlaw, Orders Not to Resuscitate:
Dilemma for Acute Care as Well as Long Term Care Facilities, 10 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 29

(1982); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 469 n.3, 380 N.E.2d 134, 136 n.3 (1978). Specifically.
such an order is designed to block cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), which stands alone as a medical
intervention that can bring a patient back to life after the onset of death. Youngner, supra at 24.
4
1 9 Youngner, supra note 148, at 24; Greenlaw, supra note 148, at 30. Much has been written about DNR
orders and the concomitant issue of withholding mechanical ventilation. See generally Dinnerstein,6
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (holding that the law does not prevent a course of medical treatment

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
which excludes attempts at resuscitation in the event of cardiac or respiratory

arrest and that the validity18

Dippel: Medical Decision-Making
Spring, 19911

MEDICAL DECIsION-MAKING

2. Initiating Treatment With The

Option To Continue Or Withdraw
"It is good medical practice to initiate the artificial provision of fluids and
nutrition when the patient's prognosis is uncertain, and to allow for the
termination of treatment at a later date when the patient's condition becomes
hopeless.'" The artificial provision of nutrition and hydration is analogous to
other forms of life-sustaining treatment, such as the use of [a ventilator].' The
decision to discontinue [either of these types] of treatment should be . . . based
on a careful evaluation of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis, the prospective
burdens of the treatment, and the stated preferences of the patient and
benefits1and
52
family."

Continuing treatment once it has been initiated is a decision frequently made
by an incompetent patient's family in consultation with the patient's treating
physicians. Few issues are raised by such a decision. However, a point is often
reached at which withdrawing treatment becomes the more humane choice for a
hopelessly ill incompetent patient. Treatment may be ethically withdrawn in any
situation in which it could ethically be withheld.1 53 Rather than withhold

treatment altogether for fear it can never be terminated, it is generally preferable
to initiate treatment with a provision for its termination at some point."54 For
that reason, the majority of court cases involving medical decisions at the end of
life consider the withdrawal, rather than the withholding, of treatment.

of a DNR order does not depend on prior judicial approval); Brennan, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders for the
Incompetent Patient in the Absence of Family Consent, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 13 (1986);
Greenlaw, supra note 148; Muslin & Schade, On the Do Not Resuscitate Policy, 31 PERSPECTIVES IN
BIOLOGY & MED. 285 (1988); Rosen, The Do Not Resuscitate Policy: JurisdictionOver Policy and the
Therapeutic Privileges,HEALTH LAW., Spring/Summer, 1990, at 3; Schade & Muslin, Do Not Resuscitate
Decisions: Discussions With Patients, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 186 (1989); Woodruff, Letting Life Run Its
Course: Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment, ARMY LAW., April,
1989, at 6; Youngner, supra note 148.
1so Position, supra note 2, at 126.
"Id. at 125. See also R. WEIR, ABATING TREATMENT WITH CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 148
(1989); Conroy, 98 N. J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209; Corbett, 487 So. 2d 368; Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 437-38, 497 N.E.2d 365, 373, 529 A.2d 419, 427-28 (1987); Delio v. Westchester
Cty. Med. Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 14, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 687-89 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 1987); In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954-55 (Maine 1987); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.L 1988);
McConnell, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596. But see Murphy & Darr, Withdrawing Nutrition and
Hydration: A Continuing Dilemma, HEALTH LAW., Winter, 1989-90, at 1. R. WEIR, supra at 149. See
also Landsman, Terminating Food and Water: Emerging Legal Rules, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY
MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LirE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 135-38 (J. Lynn ed. 1986).

'52 Id. See also Harris & Bostrum, Is the Continued Provisionof Food and Fluids in Nancy Cruzan's Best
Interests?, 5 ISSuEs IN L. & MED. 415, 418-26 (1990) (citing several arguments which assert that feeding
by tube furthers a hopelessly ill incompetent patient's best interests).
153

HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 129, at 38.
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The seminal case which addresses the issue of withdrawing treatment from
a hopelessly ill incompetent adult patient is In re Quinlan.155 On April 15,
1975, 21-year-old Karen Quinlan ceased breathing for at least two fifteen-minute
periods. 156 She was taken to a hospital, placed on a ventilator,157 and examined
by a neurologist who found her to be comatose.15 Over a course of several
weeks, Karen lapsed from the coma into a persistent vegetative state. 59
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether Karen's father could
authorize the withdrawal of her ventilator. In resolving this question ".... of
transcendent importance",'6 the Court carefully considered the positions of the
Quinlan family, the state, the treating physicians, and the Catholic Church. The
Court found that the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment was wholly inapplicable to the case. 16 1 It further refused to
recognize an independent parental right either of religious freedom or of privacy
to support the relief that Karen's father requested.' 62
However, the Court did determine that Karen Quinlan had a constitutional
right of privacy which encompassed a right to withdraw the ventilator, and that
such right could be exercised on her behalf by her father as the legal guardian of
her person. 6 3 Thus began a litany of cases in which judicial approval to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment was sought, based upon the constitutional right
of privacy.'
While only a minority of jurisdictions have addressed the issue of withholding
life-sustaining treatment 65 from hopelessly ill incompetent adults, nearly every
court that has considered the issue has taken a different approach. Appearing
only to agree that the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is grounded in

'5

Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.

'm Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
157Id.

13 Id.
"'

Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.

'60Id.
"'
162
"3

at 19, 355 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 37, 355 A.2d at 662.
Id. at 37, 355 A.2d at 661-62.
Id. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.

But see Armstrong & Calen, From Quinlan to Jobes: The Courts and the PVS Patient, 18 HASTINGs
CENTER REP. 37 (1988) (arguing that it should not be necessary for families of incompetent hopelessly
ill patients to continually seek court approval for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when a right to
withdrawal has been consistently upheld by the courts).
'"

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
'6 R. WEIR, supra note 151, at 144.
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the constitutional right of privacy, courts have contributed to the Quinlan66
legacy by setting forth standards in a wide variety of areas.
Several jurisdictions have shunned the artificial distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary treatment. While the issue was briefly discussed by the
Storar'6' Court, the Severns Court offered the clearest treatment of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment.' 6s The Court noted that in
the case of an incompetent, hopelessly ill patient, the line between the two types
of treatment greatly blurs.'6 Thus, the Court said, it is futile to argue over such
an artificial distinction when any type of treatment, be it ordinary or extraordinary, cannot cure such a patient but can only indefinitely prolong his
existence.170
Similarly, other courts have reasoned that as the prognosis of a hopelessly ill
incompetent patient dims, as the treatment becomes more futile, and as the degree
of bodily invasion required to administer that treatment grows, the patient's right
to refuse all medical treatment increases.' 71 Accordingly, one court stated:
[T]he state's interest in life encompasses a broader interest than mere
corporeal existence. In certain * * * circumstances, the burden of
maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was
meant to serve. The law recognizes the individual's right to preserve his
humanity, even if to preserve his humanity means to allow the natural
processes of a disease or affliction to bring about a death with dignity.
* * * The duty of the state to preserve life must encompass a recognition
of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual
himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his
172
humanity.
Most courts have required a high degree of certainty that a hopelessly ill
incompetent patient would want life-sustaining treatment withdrawn before such
action will be ordered. The standard was clearly enunciated when the Court of

'6 Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
'6

Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266.

'6 Severns, 425 A.2d 156.
'6 Id. at 159.
'70 Id. See also Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by
Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 394,
401-03 (1989) (discussing the ordinary/extraordinary distinction and its evolution into the more workable
proportionate/disproportionate test set forth in Barber,147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484); Harris
& Bostrum, supra note 152, at 426-28 (arguing that feeding by tube is ordinary care and not medical
treatment).

"' R. WEIR, supra note 151, at 250.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 380, 529 A.2d at 426, 439.
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Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, considered the case of Edna Leach, a
70-year-old victim of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 173 After Mrs. Leach became
unable to breathe on her own, mechanical ventilation was initiated. 174 A

nasogastric tube was also inserted. 171

Some months after life-sustaining

Leach's husband sought a court order for discontinutreatment was begun, Mrs.
76
ance of the treatment
Before it could order the withdrawal of Mrs. Leach's life-sustaining treatment,
the Court required clear and convincing evidence that such would be her choice
if she were competent to decide.177 Flatly rejecting the use of a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, 78 the Court granted the petition for discontinuance
79
of mechanical ventilation, but not the artificial nutrition and hydration.
While the clear and convincing evidence standard has appeared in all the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment decisions, one issue has consistently
divided courts and commentators alike. This highly divisive issue involves the
proper level of court involvement in these cases. Among those who have
considered this issue, three distinct points of view have come to the forefront.'8
The first court to grapple with the issue was the New Jersey Supreme Court
There, the Court urged judicial overview of, but not direct
in Quinlan.'
judicial involvement in, the decision-making process.'2 This middle-ground
position seeks to strike a balance between the protection of patient interests and

"9

Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809.

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is a "progressively

deteriorating, disabling disease of the nervous system." kI. at 2.
"7

Id. at 2-3, 426 N.E.2d at 810.

Id. At this point, Edna Leach was unresponsive to all but the most painful stimuli, Id. Electroencephalograms showed only minimal brain activity. Id.
"7

'76

Id. at 3, 426 N.E.2d at 811.

'7 Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 11, 426 N.E.2d at 815. The Court held that there was clear and convincing

evidence of Edna Leach's wishes. Id. See also In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1989) (defining "clear and convincing evidence" as "proof sufficient to persuade the trier
of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life-supports under the
circumstances like those presented"). Id. at 523, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892. The standard
was not met in O'Connor. Id. at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
"m Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 11, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
'79 Id. at 12, 426 N.E.2d at 816. Courts' use of the clear and convincing evidence standard in cases
involving withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. CL 2841 (1990). There, the Court sanctioned the
Missouri Supreme Court's use of the standard in its Cruzan v. Harmon decision, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988). Cruzan stands for the proposition that "informally expressed reactions to other people's medical
condition and treatment do not constitute clear proof of a patient's intent." Cruzan, id. at 424.

' R. WEIR, supra note 151, at 153.
"'

Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
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the minimization of judicial involvement. 13 Thus, courts which have taken this

position have limited the role of judicial involvement to a determination of
incompetency and the appointment of a guardian.184

Several years after Quinlan,85 the Supreme Court of Washington held in
In re Colyer' that when the family of a hopelessly ill incompetent patient is
familiar with the beliefs the patient held while he was competent, a decision to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment does not require prior judicial approval."
Judicial intervention should only be used as a safeguard in cases where family
members disagree about the patient's wishes, where the patient was never
competent to express his wishes,188 where no family member or guardian exists
to speak for the patient, 8 9 or where ill motives are suspected. 90
Polarized on either side of the "middle ground" position are those who have
called for total judicial intervention and those who abhor even the slightest
intervention. The court best known for favoring complete judicial intervention
is the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which resolutely stated in
Saikewicz: 91

We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making
responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction

"3R.

WEIR, supra note 151, at 153.

18id.

Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
'C Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738.
"u

"id. at 127-28, 660 P.2d at 746.
"m See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (adding that no ethics committee need be
consulted either. The Court stated that "[t]he decision whether to end the dying process is a personal
decision for family members or those who bear a legal responsibility for the patient. We do not consider
this conclusion an abdication of responsibility by the judiciary." Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723.)
'" But see, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (stating that although court involve-

ment may be required in such a case to appoint a guardian for the incompetent patient, once the guardian
has been appointed, no further judicial intervention is required). See also Note, In re Gardner:
WithdrawingMedical Carefrom PersistentlyVegetative Patients,41 ME. L. REV. 447,464 (1989) (noting
that numerous reasons have been cited to justify judicial deference to family decision-making for
incompetent patients); Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Decision-makingfor Incompetent
Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 539, 555 (1987) (citing
five reasons why family ought to decide for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients).
'90 Colyer, 99 Wash.2d at 127-28, 660 P.2d at 746. See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741

P.2d 674 (1987). The Rasmussen Court stated, "One need only look to the plethora of cases.. . where
arguments were heard or opinions were issued long after the patient had died, to conclude that judicial
Once the court resolves
intervention in decisions of this nature can indeed be unduly cumbersome ....
the matters of guardianship and incompetence, . . . its encroachment into the substantive decisions
concerning medical treatment should be limited to resolving disputes among the patient's family, the
attending physician, and independent physician, the health care facility, the guardian, and the guardian
ad litem." Id. at 224, 741 P.2d at 691.
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*. We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and
awesome question whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be
withheld from a person incapable of making his own decision as
constituting a "gratuitous encroachment" on the domain of medical
expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was
created.' 92
**

This position mandates prior court approval of all decisions to withdraw treatment
that involve both the patient's death and potential physician liability. 93
Diametrically opposed is the position of courts such as the California Court
of Appeals, which held in Barber v. Superior Court 94 that judicial involvement,
either in the form of oversight or intervention, is wholly misplaced in the context
of medical decision-making for hopelessly ill incompetent patients. The Court
stated:
* * * in the absence of legislative guidance, we find no legal requirement
that prior judicial approval is necessary before any decision to withdraw
treatment can be made. * * * [W]e agree with [the courts] which have
held that requiring judicial intervention in all cases is unnecessary and
may be unwise.' 95 * * * '[A] practice of applying to a court to confirm
such decisions * * * would be impossibly cumbersome'. 96
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida stated, in John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Bludworth197 that prior court approval is "too burdensome, is not
necessary to protect the state's interests or the interests of the patient, and could
render the right of the incompetent a nullity." '
The courts that espouse this view disfavor judicial involvement at any
level, 199 except in the most unusual or problematic situations. 0 0 Under this

2
'9
id. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434-35. For an argument that the decision-making power properly rests
with the courts and a theory of how that power should be exercised, see P. RIGA, RIGHT TO DIE OR RIGHT
TO LIVE?: LEGAL ASPECrS OF DYING AND D-ATH 1-12 (1981).

'9 R. WEnR, supra note 151, at 153.
9 Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
Ild. at 1014, 195 Cal. RpIr. at 493.
Id. (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669).
19 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921.
"

'9 Id. at 925.
'9 R. WEIR, supra note 151, at 154.
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view, treatment withdrawal decisions for hopelessly ill incompetent patients are
to be the private collaborative effort of the patient's family and physicians.20 '

3. Active Euthanasia
"Euthanasia" is derived from the Greek language and, literally, means "good
death". 20 2 Accepted and even encouraged by many early religions under certain
circumstances, euthanasia in the form of suicide was viewed as an appropriate and
merciful release from incurable suffering.2° Today, although no American
jurisdiction considers suicide to be a crime, most consider rendering assistance to
24
All modem legal jurisdictions consider active
commit suicide to be a crime.
20 5
euthanasia to be a crime.

Active euthanasia is largely condemned under the theory that one who
deliberately acts to cause the death of another does so with malice, even if he
intends no ill will and believes that his act is morally justified. 2' Nonetheless,
courts have sympathized 20with
an accused whose act of euthanasia was motivated
7
by mercy for the victim.
Although laymen have traditionally gone unpunished for committing acts of
euthanasia,0 8 the weight of opinion dictates that physicians ought not engage
in such acts. 209 The American Medical Association Judicial Council posits that
a physician ". . . should not intentionally cause death. '210 Arthur Caplan,
Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota in

201

id.

20 G. POZGAR, supra note 7, at 233.
203Id.

at 233-34.
p.RIGA, supra note 192, at 91.
205 id.
204

20

6 id.

Id. at 96. See Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 15
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 232-34 (1987/88); Molenda, Active Euthanasia: Can It Be Justified?,
24 U. TULSA L REV. 165 (1988) (both citing to numerous instances of unpunished acts of euthanasia).
See also Fadiman, The Liberation of Lolly & Gronky, LIFE, Dec., 1986, at 71 (a moving account of an
elderly couple's choice to free themselves from the trap of incurable chronic illnesses that plagued them
both. Sharing a single glass, they drank together the mixture of whiskey and crushed tranquilizer tablets
that killed them. Id.)
207

200But see Ubell, When a Life is in Your Hands, PARADE MAGAZINE, March 5, 1989, at 16 (noting that

in the Florida case of Roswell Gilbert, who shot to death his incurably sick wife in 1985, a life sentence

was imposed. Gilbert served several years of the sentence before being released from prison in 1990.)
209But see Haney, Doctors Condone Helping the Dying Commit Suicide, Akron Beacon J., March 30,
1989, at A-I, col. 5 (citing a report of a twelve-member panel of physicians which concluded that it is
ethical for physicians to assist terminally or hopelessly ill patients in ending their lives by prescribing
lethal doses of certain drugs).
20 Devettere, Reconceptualizing the Euthanasia Debate, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 145 (1989)
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Minneapolis, does not believe physicians should kill because "[aictive euthanasia
Q11
is easy to abuse and misuse. It sows distrust between doctor and patient.
The recent case of Michigan physician Jack Kevorkian underscores the
widespread disapproval of physician-assisted suicides or active euthanasia 22
Although murder charges against the doctor were dismissed,2 13 Kevorkian has
been ordered never to use his "suicide machine" again.214 The outcome of Dr.
Kevorkian's case is consistent with the view expressed by Rita Marker, Director
of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force. 2 "
She believes that if
physicians are permitted to aid in causing the deaths of terminally ill or
hopelessly ill patients,216"the professional healer and care-giver will take on [the]
role [of] hired killer.,

AUTONOMY BY PROXY:
WHO DECIDES FOR THE HOPELESSLY ILL
INCOMPETENT ADULT PATIENT AND How

Options
There are limited means by which a hopelessly ill incompetent adult patient's
right to have medical treatment withdrawn or withheld can be exercised.
Obviously, the patient can no longer exercise the right by himself. If the patient
had the foresight to prepare some type of advance directive, his wishes regarding
treatment are more easily honored. Even in that event, a surrogate decision-maker
will need to effectuate the patient's choice(s).

supra note 208, at 16-17. The author builds on Caplan's comments and cites the rampant
practice of active euthanasia in Holland as evidence of the fostering of distrust in the physician-patient
relationship. The author claims that in many of the 5000 annual cases of active euthanasia in Holland,
the patients do not want to die but are killed by their physicians "for their own good". Id. at 17.
212Suicide Machine's Use Is Prohibited,Akron Beacon J., Feb. 6, 1991, at D-7, col. 1. Kevorkian helped
a victim of Alzhcimer's disease commit suicide by using a machine that he invented. Id.
213 Levin, Doctor Who Aided in Suicide is Cleared, Akron Beacon J., Dec. 14, 1990, at A-10, col. 4. The
charges were dismissed because Michigan has no specific law against assisting suicide. Id.
214 Suicide Machine's Use Is Prohibited, supra note 212. The opinion rendered in the Circuit Court of
Oakland County, Michigan scolded Dr. Kevorkian for his "bizarre behavior". Id. The court stated, "As
a physician, Dr. Kevorkian was morally, ethically, professionally, and legally obligated to adhere to the
current standards of medical practice." Id. The Court stated that assisting suicides is a clear violation
of those obligations. Id.
23- "Aid-In-Dying":The Right to Die or the Right to Kill?: A Public Forum, INT'L REV., Spring, 1988,
at 54, 61.
236 Id. For arguments for and against active euthanasia as an option for hopelessly ill patients, see
Comment, The Right to Voluntary Euthanasia, 10 WHrrnER L. REv. 489 (1988); Gelfand, Euthanasia
and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REv. 741 (1984); Kuhse, The Case for Active Voluntary
211 Ubell,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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Where no advance directive exists, the patient's family and physician may

jointly determine the course of the patient's treatment. In some cases, a guardian
or conservator will decide for the patienL In all cases in which a surrogate makes
a medical decision on behalf of an incompetent patient, the decision must rest
upon well-established rules of law that are designed to protect the patient's

interests.
1. Advance Directives

Various forms of advance directives are recognized in this country.
Generally, they include the living will, the durable power of attorney, and the
health care agent or proxy. The durable power of attorney and health care agent
or proxy work to ensure reliance by third parties upon a surrogate decision-

maker's authority, so as to protect the patient's interests.217 Through such a
directive, a competent individual may delegate to a surrogate the authority to
make medical decisions on his behalf should he become incompetent. 8

The most common statutorily authorized form of advance directive is the
living will.219 Through this document, a legally competent adult writes an
affirmative directive to medical personnel to withhold or withdraw certain medical
treatment in certain circumstances.Y0 Individuals creating a living will are

21

Comment, The Dilemma of the Person in a Persistent Vegetative State: A Plea to the Legislaturefor

Help, 54 Mo. L. REv. 645, 659-60 (1989).
21 Id. See also Moore, The Durable Power of Attorney as an Alternative to the Improper Use of ConservatorshipforHealth Care Decisionmaking, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 631 (1986). Currently, nine states
have adopted durable power of attorney statutes that make no mention of medical decisions, while nine
others have adopted statutes that do not mention medical decisions but have been either judicially or
legislatively interpreted to cover such decisions. Society for the Right to Die, State Law Governing
Durable Power of Attorney, Health Care Agents, Proxy Appointments (Oct. 29, 1990). Twenty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted durable power of attorney statutes that specifically authorize
surrogates to make medical decisions, including decisions to withhold or withdraw life support, while
seven states allow all surrogate medical decision-making except that which would authorize withholding
or withdrawal of life support. Id. Finally, twelve states have enacted statutes that permit individuals to
appoint proxies to make decisions authorized under the particular statute when the patient is in a medical
condition covered by the statute. Id.
219 Comment, supra note 217, at 660.
IId. at 655. The directive will generally resemble the following document, prepared by the Society for
the Right to Die:
LIVING WILL DECLARATION
To my Family. Doctors, and All Those Concerned with My Care
I, _,
being of sound mind, make this statement as a directive to be
followed if I become unable to participate in decisions regarding my medical care.
If I should be in an incurable or irreversible mental or physical condition with no
reasonable expectation of recovery, I direct my attending physician to withhold or withdraw
treatment that merely prolongs my dying. I further direct that treatment be limited to measures
to keep me comfortable and to relieve pain.
These directions express my legal right to refuse treatment. Therefore I expect my
family,
doctors, and everyone1991
concerned with my care to regard themselves as legally and
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
morally bound to act in accordance with my wishes, and in so doing to be free of any legal lia-
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advised to keep the signed original in a safe place at home, and to review, initial
and date the document periodically to indicate continued intent. 21 Copies of
the document are to be provided to the individual's family, doctors and
proxy.222
2. The Surrogate Decision-Maker
In most cases, treatment decisions for the incompetent patient are intensely
private and made by the patient's family and physicians. 223 The family
members normally considered close enough to make such a decision include the
patient's spouse, parents, adult children, or siblings. 2 If another relative acts
as a member of the patient's nuclear family, he may also be a suitable surrogate

bility for having followed my directions.
I especially do not want: (space for listing specific treatment patient does not want]
Other instructions/comments: [space for listing other wishes]
Proxy Designation Clause: Should I become unable to communicate my instructions
as stated above, I designate the following person to act in my behalf:
Name:
Address:
If the person I have named above is unable to act on my behalf, I authorize the following
person to do so:
Address:
Date:
Witness:
Address:

Name:
Signed:
Witness:
Address:
22' Comment, supra
22

note 217, at 455.

Id. At present, living will laws are in effect in all but eight of the states in the United States. Society

for the Right to Die, Living Will Legislation in the United States (April 9, 1990). All but one of the
states without living will legislation have living will bills pending in their state legislatures. Id. South
Dakota is the only state which has shown no movement toward any type of living will law. Id. Although
living wills have come to be recognized as important documents, they are not without shortcomings.
Arthur Caplan notes that "they may not exactly fit the situation when the time comes ....
[t]he family
and the doctor may not know about [a patient's] will.... land in many instances, family members may
disregard [a patient's] will and order the doctor to follow their wishes rather than [the patient's]." Ubell,
supra note 208, at 17. Dr. Robert White, Head of Neurosurgery at Cleveland's Metro Health Medical
Center, dislikes the finality and rigidity of the living will. Morning Exchange (ABC television broadcast,
local affiliate WEWS, Cleveland, Jan. 2, 1991). He believes the documents are binding and leave little
leeway for the changes of mind patients often experience. Id. For a discussion on how advance
directives can be created to best reflect the wishes of the patient, see Gibson, Reflecting on Values, 50
OIo ST. L. J. 451 (1990). For an argument that advance directives do not adequately preserve patients'
personal identity, see, Buchanan, Advance Directives and the PersonalIdentityProblem, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 277 (1988). See also UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (Draft 1990), which, as
amended, offers a new approach to advance directives by combining the concepts behind the living will
and the appointment of a health care surrogate. However, the Act applies only to those patients who are
terminally ill (facing imminent death). Id. at 1, 4.
2
13 Comment, TerminationofLife-Sustaining Treatment: Who and How to Decide, 33 N.Y.L Sca. L REV.
469, 479 (1988).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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(1987).
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decision-maker for the incompetent patient. However, absent such a close degree

of kinship, a guardian must usually be appointed. 225
Unless a patient has executed an advance directive while competent, or there
is irrefutable evidence of the patient's beliefs and wishes, the surrogate must act
upon his own intuition. Essentially, this destroys, rather than protects, the
patient's fundamental rights of self-determination and privacy. 226 Judicial
standards that have sought to protect the rights and interests of hopelessly ill
incompetent adult patients include the substituted judgment (subjective) standard,
and the best interests (objective) standard. 7
a. The Substituted Judgment Standard
Most courts that have addressed the issue of medical decision-making for
hopelessly ill incompetent patients have adopted the substituted judgment
standard.228 This standard treats the incompetent patient as if he were competent and requires an inquiry into what the patient would choose for himself. 229
The standard considers the patient's incompetence, as well as a variety of proof,
including advance directives and oral testimony about the patient's beliefs and
wishes.2 30 Clearly, this standard is most useful when the patient has manifested
23
his intent while competent. '

225Id. See also Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (patient had no family, relatives, or dose

friends to speak on his behalf, and a guardian was thus appointed to make his medical decisions); Drabick
v. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988) (conservator sought court approval to
remove patient's nasogastric feeding tube). For more on conservatorship as an alternative to guardianship,
see Federman, Conservatorship: A Viable Alternative to Incompetency, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 815 (1986).
A guardian may be either someone who knows the patient, or a stranger, depending upon the situation.
Veatch, Limits of GuardianTreatment Refusal: A Reasonableness Standard,9 AM. J. L. & MED. 427, 428
(1984). This commentator takes a very common-sense approach to the issue of guardianship. He
categorizes guardians as either "bonded" or "non-bonded", depending upon whether they have a bond or
a tie with the patient prior to the guardianship. Id. He prefers bonded guardians over non-bonded
guardians because they are better able to stand in the stead of the patient when representing him/her. Id.
226Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 380 (1988). See also Ellman, Cruzan v.
Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others can Exercise an Incompetent Patient's Right to Die, 29
JURIMETRICS J. 389, 396-99 (1989).
227 For an exhaustive debate on these standards, see Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 375 (1988); Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OWo ST. L. J. 425 (1990).
22 Note, The BarberDecision: A QuestionableApproach to Termination of Life Support Systems for the
Patient in a Persistent Vegetative State. 15 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 371, 378 (1985).
2n Id.; Schultz, Proceduresand Limitationsfor Removal of Life-Sustaining Treatment from Incompetent
Patients, 34 ST. T. Louis U.L.J. 277, 289 (1990).
2" Comment, Terminationof Life-SustainingTreatment: Who andHow to Decide, 33 N.Y.L SCH. L REV.
469, 486 (1988).
23'Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674. The standard was first applied in Quinlan, supra note 38,
her intent while. competent. It was more properly applied
in Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 365, 529 A.2d 419.

although the patient had not clearly expressed
Published
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b. The Best Interests Standard
Where the substituted judgment standard is inapplicable or inappropriate,
courts will apply the best interests standard. 232 This standard does not consider
the patient's presumed wishes, but rather, the patient's best interests in his current
state.233 The question becomes whether the treatment, in light of the extended
life and the burden of that extended life, serves the patient's best interests.234

LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN
CARING FOR HOPELESSLY ILL INCOMPETENT ADULT
PATIENTS: IS THE BARK WORSE THAN THE BITE?

Despite the fact that courts have consistently ruled against liability for medical
professionals who honor a patient's treatment refusal, looming ominously over
this country's hospitals is the somewhat contrived specter of incarceration or civil
damages.' 35 However, in the only reported case in .which physicians were
charged with homicide for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a hopelessly

ill incompetent adult patient at his family's request, the charges were ultimately
dismissed on the ground that the patient's family could legally exercise the
patient's right to refuse treatment. 2" Ironically, while fears of civil or criminal
liability for withholding or withdrawing treatment are largely unfounded, failing
to withhold or withdraw treatment on the request of a hopelessly ill incompetent
may result in the very legal entanglement
adult patient's surrogate decision-maker
237
which is sought to be avoided.

Comrnment, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presentedby Incompetent
Patientswith no PriorExpression of a Treatment Preference, 64 NoTRE DAME L REV. 394, 407 (1989).
' Id.; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 790, 370 N.E.2d 417.
23 Note, supra note 228, at 379. In reaching a determination under the best interests standard, several
factors are considered. These include the extent of bodily invasion caused by the life-sustaining treatment,
the dignity of the patient, the amount of suffering, the quality and duration of life sustained with or
without treatment, expressions of the patient, and the amount of emotional and financial suffering of those
closest to the patient Schultz, supra note 229, at 290. Most closely aligned with the best interests
standard are Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 and Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209.
Comment, PatientAutonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Available Remedies, 33 ST. LOuIs
U.LJ. 711, 716 (1989).
2m Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
232

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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Comment, supra note 235.
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While a number of plaintiffs have sought to recover in actions for wrongfully
instituting and maintaining life-sustaining treatment,2 38 only one reported case
exists in which the plaintiff was successful.239
In Leach v. Shapiro,4 the Court conceded that "doctors must be free to
exercise their best medical judgment in treating a life threatening emergency. '
However, the Court also warned that, "[carnied to its extreme.... the doctrine
On that
of implied consent could effectively nullify. . . privacy rights. .".'
basis, the Court held the defendant physician and other medical professionals
involved liable for instituting mechanical ventilation in the hopelessly ill incomrefusal of the patient herself and without the
petent patient, over the express 24prior
3
consent of the patient's family.
In a case in which the plaintiff is successful, the treating facility itself may
be held liable under the theory of corporate liability. 2" Corporate liability
differs from vicarious liability in that the lack of an employment relationship will
not necessarily protect a facility from liability for the negligent acts of its medical
staff. 5 Accordingly, where a treating facility negligently violates its duty of
reasonable care to the patient and thereby contributes to the patient's injury, the
facility will be liable.2' However, courts are split on whether the hospital's
duty extends broadly to supervising the quality of the ongoing treatment rendered
by independent staff physicians, or only to the exercise of reasonable care in
staff members prior to granting them
screening the competency of independent
247
medical privileges at the facility.

2m Miller, Right-to-die DamageActions: Developments in the Law, 85 DEN. U.L. REV. 181, 185 (1988).
See Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1980); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bouvia v. Cty. of Los Angeles. 195
Cal. App. 3d 1075, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1987); McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n., 216 N.J. Super. 502,
524 A.2d 450 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 108 N.J. 182, 528 A.2d 12 (1987); Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation
Hosp., 676 F.Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523,

538 A.2d 346 (1988); Winter v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. A8910187 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. Ohio
filed Nov. 17, 1989).
29 Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
20 Id.
24

Id. at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.

2 Id.
243id.

2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.
2' Spencer & Palmisano, SpecializedNutritionalSupport of Patients-A Hospital'sLegalDuty?. QUAuTY

REv. BULL, May, 1985, at 160, 160.
m Id.
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HOLINESS:

MEDICAL AND RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINTS ON MEDICAL
DECISION-MAKING FOR HOPELESSLY ILL INCOMPETENT ADULT PATIENTS

Medical Viewpoints
"I do not favor besetting the last few minutes of a person's life with pumping
on the chest, intubation, and all that sort of useless drama," says one oncologist.2 8 He urges physicians to remember that they ultimately owe their
allegiance to their patients, and whatever the patient's decision is, it ought to be
followed. 9 A nurse agrees, saying that the patient should be allowed to
choose his/her own medical course of treatment if possible, but where the patient
is incompetent, those closest to the patient sh6uld decide whether measures will
be employed to prolong a hopeless life.250
Codes governing both nursing in particular and medicine in general address
the issue as well. The American Nurses' Association Code of Ethics for Nurses
(Code for Professional Nurses) states that a nurse is responsible for affirming and
maintaining a patient's right to privacy and self-determination. 25' Addressing
the issue more broadly, the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs adopted the following statement on March 15, 1986:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other,
the choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the
patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the
absence of the patient's choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must
act in the best interest of the patient.
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what is
medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment
to permit a terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to die.
However, he should not intentionally cause death. In deciding whether
Van Scoy-Mosher, An Oncologist's Casefor No-Code Orders, in LEGAL AND ETIlCAL ASPECTS OF
TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 14, 14 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982).
24

20 Id. at 17. Physicians appear to have mixed feelings on the use of advance directives. See Zinberg,
Decisionsfor the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians'Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT.
L. REV. 445, 468-484 (1989); but see Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 248, at 17, stating that an
incompetent patient's prior expression of wishes is merely a legal convenience for the courts but is not
really valid. Id. He believes people make statements that purport to express their desires upon reaching
a certain point in life, but that when they actually reach that point, they feel differently. Id.
2" King, A Nurse's View of Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING
CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 14, 14 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
2' Id. at 21.
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the administration of potentially life-prolonging medical treatment is in
the best interest of the patient who is incompetent to act in his own
behalf, the physician should determine what the possibility is for
extending life under humane and comfortable conditions and what are the
prior expressed wishes of the patient and attitudes of the family or those
who have responsibility for custody of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of
the diagnosis and with the concurrence of those who have responsibility
for the care of the patient it is not unethical to discontinue all means of
life-prolonging medical treatment.
Life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a
terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all
times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained.252
"We must give those patients a way out. There comes a time that the
physician must step back and, at the patient's or the family's request, allow the
253
patient to die with dignity.
Religious Viewpoints
The consensus among religions which have spoken on the issue is much the
same as that of the medical profession. The fundamental principle of doing unto
others as we would want done to ourselves is common to the major religions of
the world. 2 Applying that principle to the issue of medical decision-making
for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients, a Methodist minister stated that "the
medical and moral duty of all of us is to keep the patient comfortable until
death. 2 55 Agreeing is a professor of theology at the University of Notre Dame,
who believes that, "[gliven a reasonably certain diagnosis that the person won't

252 American

Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Withholding or Withdrawing

Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment (March 15, 1986).
23 Ubell, supra note 208, at 16 (quoting Dr. James H. Sammons, then-executive vice president of the
American Medical A-ssociation). See also Koop, Decisions at the End of Life, 5 ISSUES IN L & MED.
225 (1989). Some physicians argue that this obligation to let patients die with dignity encompasses the
act of euthanasia, as well. See Caplan, It's
Time We Helped PatientsDie, MED. ECON., June 8, 1987, at

214.
2-4
M.HEn:ETrz THE RIGHT TO DIE ix-x (1975) (citing to the existence of the principle in Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confuscianism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam).
z Ubell, supra note 208, at 17 (quoting Rev. J. Robert Nelson, Director of the Institute of Religion at
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return to a cognitive state ... [life-sustaining]
treatment can be withheld, because
25 6
benefit.'
any
get
cannot
patient
the
Well-known for its pro-life stance, the Catholic Church has spoken out most
clearly on the issue of medical decision-making for hopelessly ill incompetent
adult patients. The Catholic Church has long taught that life is a fundamental
good for which we are obliged to care and show respect. 257 However, life is
not viewed as the ultimate or absolute good, and the limit to our duty to preserve
life is reached when the effort to sustain it beccmes an overwhelming burden for
consistent with
a patient whose prognosis is hopeless.258 Sometimes, it is more
259
the concept of respect for life to let it go, than to cling to iL
In Delio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Center,260 a Jesuit priest was called to
testify as an expert witness on the ethics of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
from hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients. 26' He testified that
a Vatican document published in 1980 rejected the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means of life support as a measure
of when it would be ethical to discontinue those means of support; rather,
the Vatican adopted a test of proportionality under which the measure of
whether to discontinue life-sustaining mechanisms was whether those
mechanisms would provide benefits to the patient greater that
the burdens
262
imposed on the patient, the family and others as a result.
* * *

It is clear, however, that the position of the Catholic Church stops short of
sanctioning active euthanasia.2 63

2'6 Id. (quoting Fr. Richard McCormick). See also Clergy Comment, Akron Beacon J., Jan 15, 1991, at

C-1, col. 1; Doerflinger, Artificial Feeding, Catholic Universe Bull., May 20, 1988, at 11-A, col. 1;
Pumphrey, Life and Death, Catholic Universe Bull., Jan. 29, 1988, at 5, co. 1.
Bayley, Who Should Decide?, in LEGAL AND ETHIcAL AsPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 3, 4 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982).
2

id. at 4-5.
l'
"
26

id. at 5.
516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 129 A.D.2d 1 (1987).

26' Id. at 683, 129 A.D.2d at 9.
'Id.

26

See, Molenda, supra note 207, at 18-19; Pilla, All Human Life Deserves Respect, Justice and Love,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
Catholic Universe Bull., Sept. 28, 1990, at 1C, col. 1.
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MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR HOPELESSLY ILL
INCOMPETENT ADULT PATIENTS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

Two unprecedented developments in the area of medical decision-making for
hopelessly ill incompetent patients occurred in 1990: the United States Supreme
Court decided Cruzan v. Director,Mo. Dept. of Health,2 6 and Congress enacted
what has come to be called the "Patient Self-Determination Act". 26 These
developments symbolize the recent recognition, at the federal level, of the
difficulty of medical decision-making for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients.
Both have already begun to leave their mark on the state of the law.
Cruzan v. Director,Mo. Dept. of Health266
In Cruzan,267 the plaintiffs appealed from a decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court denying them the authority to remove the feeding tube that
sustained their daughter, who had been in a persistent vegetative state since a
1983 car accident.268 Nancy Cruzan suffered severe brain damage after she was
thrown from her car and lay face-down in a ditch for about fifteen minutes before
paramedics arrived.2 69 Detecting no cardiac or respiratory function, the
paramedics resuscitated Nancy and took her to a hospital, where she remained
unconscious. 2' ° After three weeks in a coma, Nancy lapsed into a persistent
vegetative state. 271 She was able to breathe on her own; however, a gastrostomy tube was implanted in her abdomen to allow her to obtain nutrition and
hydration.272
Realizing that Nancy would never regain cognitive functioning, her parents
requested the hospital medical staff to withdraw nutrition and hydration. 27 3 The
staff refused to do so without a court order, accordingly, the Cruzans obtained
such an order from the state trial court.27 4 That decision was reversed by the

2" 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
266 110 S.Ct. 2841.
2

Id.

26 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
26 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
270id.
271 id.

272id.

273Id. at 2846.
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Supreme Court of Missouri,275 and Nancy continued to exist in a persistent
vegetative state, sustained by artificial nutrition and hydration.27 6
The United States Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy review of relevant
judicial precedent before addressing the issue, as stated by the Court: "Whether
the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as
a 'right to die'".277 The Court found that a competent person does have a right
to refuse any medical treatment, but grounded that right in the constitutional

guarantee of liberty under the fourteenth amendment,
rather than the right of
279
78
privacy espoused by Quinlan? and its progeny.

The Court cautioned that while a competent patient has a right to refuse
medical treatment, to claim that an incompetent patient has the same right is to
beg the question.
The Court stated that "an incompetent person is not able
to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to
refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if
at all, by some sort of surrogate." 281

Accordingly, the Court held, states'

establishment of procedural safeguards to ensure that the surrogate effectuates the
patient's wishes is wholly proper.2"
The Court commented that while a surrogate decision-maker may have the
noblest of motives in attempting to assert a patient's right to refuse treatment, the
surrogate's choice may not be the same choice that the patient would have

275

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).

276

Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.

277id.
273

70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.

279 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851, 2851 n.7. The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), and agreed with that decision's conclusion
that the Quinlan Court was presumptuous in its finding that the right to refuse medical treatment was
encompassed by the right of privacy. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated
that the Quinlan Court had cited to the United States Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Conn., 381
U.S. 479 (1965), as authority for the proposition that the right of privacy exists, and "without further
analysis" presumed that the right encompassed the right to refuse medical treatment. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d
at 418. The Missouri Court had "grave doubts as to the applicability of privacy rights to decisions to
terminate the provision of food and water to an incompetent patient," in light of the narrow construction
of the right in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The United States Supreme Court agreed, and
stated that "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a
generalized right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in
terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
2 Id. at 2852.
23 id.
2m2 Id.
The Court endorsed the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard by which to judge the
evidence of an incompetent's wishes expressed while competent. Id. The Court determined that such a
standard properly advances both the state's legitimate interest in preserving life and the patient's interest
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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made. 28 3 The best way to guard against such situations and to truly protect the
patient's right to self-determination is to require clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's wishes. 2 84 That standard was not met in Cruzan, and the
judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court was affirmed.28 5
The "PatientSelf-DeterminationAct"
The essence of the Supreme Court's ruling in Cruzan?' is that while
individuals have a constitutionally-protected right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, states may prevent family members from withdrawing the lifesustaining treatment of hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients about whose
wishes there is no clear and convincing evidence. Obviously, the clearest and

most convincing evidence is that which is memorialized in a writing, such as an
advance directive.

Accordingly, in November, 1990, Congress passed what has become known
as the "Patient Self-Determination Act, ',2 87 the intent of which is to enhance
awareness of the availability of the option to create such documents. The Act
requires that all Medicare and Medicaid participating health care institutions
maintain written policies and procedures on advance directives "with respect to
all adult individuals receiving medical care by or through the provider or
organization." 28" The law, effective December 1, 1991,289 defines "advance
directive" as " ... a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of
attorney for health care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as
recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the provision of such care
when the individual is incapacitated.2 9 0

20
24

Id. at 2855-56.
Id. at 2856.

Id. After the issuance of the Supreme Court decision, the Cruzans introduced new testimony and
medical evidence in the Circuit Court for Jasper County, Missouri. Subsequently, the State of Missouri
withdrew from the court proceedings. On December 14, 1990, the Circuit Court of Jasper County,
Missouri issued an order authorizing the removal of Nancy's feeding tube. Steinbrook, Comatose
Woman's Parents Win Right to Stop Feedings, Akron Beacon J., Dec. 15, 1990, at A-I, col. 3. Nancy's
feeding tube was removed that same day, and she died December 26, 1990. Woman in Right to Die
Debate is Dead, Akron Beacon J., Dec. 27, 1990, at A-I, col. 1.
236 110 S. Ct. 2841.
210

07

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).

n New Law Requires Hospitals to Ask About Living Wills, 7 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 1, 1 (1991)
[hereinafter New Law]; O.B.R.A. of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206(a)(2), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
289 § 4206(e)(1).
'90§ 4206(a)(2). Specifically, the law requires Medicare and Medicaid participating health care facilities
to do the following:
[11 provide written information to each adult receiving care concerning
[a] an individual's rights under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
courts of the State) to make decisions concerning such medical care, including the right to
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According to Fenella Rouse, executive director of the Society for the Right
to Die, "[plassage of this bill represents a real breakthrough and a significant step

forward toward recognition of individuals' rights at the end of life. [It is a signal]
that this291is serious and must be talked about. It's going to change the whole
world."

A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Not all state statutes governing advance directives are created equal. The
effect of the Patient Self-Determination Act is partially lessened by lack of
national uniformity as to the scope of citizens' rights when creating advance
directives. 292 Moreover, in states with no living will laws, the clear and
convincing evidence standard set forth in Cruzan293 becomes an insurmountable
obstacle.
Given the Cruzan decision and the Patient Self-Determination Act, states
should not be permitted to govern the legal aspects of medical decision-making
for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients in such a random manner. A more
workable plan would either regulate medical decision-making for hopelessly ill
incompetent adult patients on the federal level, or, more feasibly, set minimum
standards at the federal level to which each state must adhere in promulgating its

accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives
**

*; and

[b] the written policies of the provider or organization respecting the implementation of
such rights;
* * * [2] document in the individual's medical record whether or not the individual has
executed an advance directive;
* * * [3] not * * * condition the provision of care or otherwise discriminate against an
individual based on whether or not the individual has executed an advance directive [not to be
construed as requiring the provision of care which conflicts with an advance directive];
* * * [4] ensure compliance with requirements of State law (whether statutory or as recognized
by the courts of the State) respecting advance directives at facilities of the provider or organization; and
* * * [5] provide (individually or with others) for education for staff and the community on
issues concerning advance directives. Id.
293New Law, supra note 288.
***

292 Consider the quandary of a person who makes a legally valid and binding advance directive in one

state and subsequently moves to another state where he becomes incompetent before creating an advance
directive in conformity with the laws of that state. Worse yet, consider the possibility that the second
state may have no workable laws governing advance directives. This point raises doubt as to whether
these issues should be considered on the state level. McNeilLehrer News Hour: Focus on Cruzan Case
(PBS television broadcast, Dec. 31, 1990).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6
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own laws on the issue. Such minimum standards might include the following:
1. A provision in every state allowing a competent adult
individual to name a durable power of attorney for health care, or other
health care proxy, to make medical decisions for the principal if he
becomes incompetent, to the same extent that the principal could if he
were competent, and with no expiration date. The attorney in fact or
health care proxy would be authorized to refuse all life-sustaining
treatment, including nutrition and hydration, provided the patient is either
terminally ill (facing imminent death) or hopelessly ill (having a total loss
of cerebral cortical functioning with no expectation of recovery, and is
permanently, irreversibly unconscious).
2. A provision in every state that, in order for a surrogate
decision-maker to exercise the right of an incompetent patient to refuse
medical treatment, there must be conclusive evidence of the patient's
wishes and beliefs as expressed while he was competent. Such evidence
may be measured by a standard which requires the evidence to be clear
and convincing, but in no event may such evidence be measured by a
standard which requires the evidence to be probative beyond a reasonable
doubt.
3. A provision in every state allowing a competent adult
individual to execute a living will for the purpose of establishing conclusive evidence of his intent where a surrogate decision-maker may be
acting on behalf of the one executing the living will if he becomes
incompetent. The executor of a living will may specify refusals of any
treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, to be withheld or withdrawn
in the event he becomes incompetent.
4. A provision in every state making advance directives legally
valid, binding, and of full force and effect. Advance directives are to be
complied with to the fullest possible extent in making medical decisions
for incompetent patients who executed them prior to becoming incompetent.
5. A provision in every state absolving from all civil and
criminal liability any health care professional who takes part in complying with the advance directive of a patient or the decision of an incompetent patient's surrogate decision-maker to have treatment withheld or
withdrawn. This provision will apply only to the extent that the action
taken strictly complies with the advance directive or authorization of the
surrogate. This provision will not supersede the laws of a particular state
pertaining to assisting suicide.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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6. A provision in every state that no judicial intervention is
required, unless no advance directive exists, no surrogate decision-maker
exists, or suspicious motives exist on the part of a surrogate decisionmaker.
States would be free to add to these minimums, so long as such additions
further, rather than encroach upon, the scope of patients' rights. Such a
framework would truly allow maximal preservation and recognition of hopelessly
ill incompetent adult patients' rights and dignity, with minimal interference in,
and prolongation of, the dying process. In addition to this framework, it may be
wise to implement expanded public education about medical decision-making for
hopelessly ill incompetent patients. Provisions for advance directives in the law
will do little good if people are unaware of or unfamiliar with them.

CONCLUSION

Medical decision-making for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients is an
area in which the disciplines of medicine, law, ethics, and religion intersect on a
daily basis. Advances in technology, growth of the elderly population, and incurability of many diseases promise to continue that area of intersect well into the
future. To deal effectively with the issues raised, there is a need for greater
public awareness about options for what are essentially end-of-life decisions, as
well as uniformity in the laws that govern those decisions. Moreover, medical
professionals who comply with the advance directives of incompetent patients or
the decisions made by their surrogates must not be held liable for such compliance.
Most importantly, the need for judicial involvement in the area of medical
decision-making for hopelessly ill incompetent adult patients must be minimized.
Incompetent patients at or near the end of life and those close to them endure a
living hell unimaginable to those who haven't experienced it personally. To
prolong the dying process of such patients is to prolong an existence that should
be allowed to come to a natural end in the irreversible, incurable disease process,
as well as to prolong the grief of loved ones who perpetually mourn the
simultaneous loss and horrific existence of one suspended in the "twilight
zone" 294 between life and death.
As the shadows of evening fall eerily across my father's bed, I ponder upon
that "twilight zone" in which he is now suspended. I wonder what it is like to be
in such a state, and silently reaffirm my desire never to be subjected to such an
2" Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/6

674, 678 (1987).
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existence. My heart is torn between happiness that he is still with us, and an
aching mournfulness that the best parts of him are forever lost. He is with us all
the time; yet, I miss him so much. Ironically, I sometimes think his very
presence makes me miss him all the more.
I have tried for years to find some good in his illness, if only to help me
justify it in my own mind. Perhaps the good borne of it has been that my family
has been strengthened both as a unit and as individuals. Each of us has been
inspired by his courage and determination, and made more acutely aware of the
beauty of life's smallest blessings. We have each become more patient and
understanding of the special needs of others. And we have all been given an
opportunity to evaluate for ourselves what our own wishes will be if, someday,
we should be in a condition like that of my father.
As I step away from his bedside, my father's eyes gaze in a wide, child-like
stare, almost as if they are looking through me. I am troubled by thoughts I want
so much for us to be able to share. But for now, I know that all my questions
will have to wait. I am somehow comforted by the knowledge that he cannot
remain in this "twilight zone" forever, and I suspect that someday we will meet
again under better circumstances. Until then, his spirit will live with me always.
As I turn out the light beside his bed, I gently kiss his cheek. Good night,
Dad. I love you.
POSTSCRIPT
On November 7, 1991, the fragile threads which had suspended my father in
the "twilight zone" snapped, and he crossed the line that separates life from death.
My mother had sensed his impending passage, and had gathered all of us at his
bedside. Although his last thirty-six hours with us were turbulent ones -- his
body wracked with unrelenting, violent seizures -- his death came so quickly that
it was several moments before we knew he was truly gone.
As the color drained from his face, the ventilator at his bedside continued
momentarily to infuse him with its now-empty breaths of artificial life. The faint
"whoosh-whoosh" to which we had all grown so accustomed suddenly seemed
almost deafening in contrast to the stillness which had befallen the room. The
moment I had feared most in life was at once here and gone, and a peaceful
tranquility slowly enveloped the house.
My father's death has caused me to reflect on everything I've written on the
preceding pages. In my father's case, incompetence was a sudden and unexpected
development, and the onset of PVS was even more sudden. However, it is the
case with many patients that their loved ones, who see them change gradually on
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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a daily basis, do not recognize the encroaching walls of incompetence until those
walls have become firmly entrenched. Thus, whether the onset of incompetence
is sudden or gradual, it is often not recognized until it has come to pass.
Accordingly, I cannot stress enough the importance of anticipating a situation
in which one may become hopelessly ill and incompetent, and of discussing one's
wishes in that event with those who will ultimately be left to carry them out. I
remain firmly committed to the position that each of us, while competent, has the
right to pre-arrange our release from the earthly prison of hopeless illness.
Several years ago, before his mind fell prey to disease, my father wrote poetry
which spoke of the pain he felt in being trapped within that prison. The
following words, excerpted from one of his poems, are perhaps the most poignant:
It is light now,
and at last
I am free
From my
Dark and cramped
Confinement.
I can feel it now The happiness of
Unfettered freedom
At last, at last
I can fly.
Forever
I yearned to
Shed the bond
And the weight
Of Earth,
I am free,
Watch me now ..
I am free.
DEBRA L. DIPPEL
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